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BOOK REVIEWS
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By Morris R. Cohen
and Felix S. Cohen. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951. Pp. viii, 944,

$8.50.
MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW. By Edwin W. Patterson.
Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1953. Pp. viii, 649.
JURISPRUDENCE:

JURISPRUDENCE - ITS AMERICAN PROPHETS. By Harold Gill Reuschlein.
Introduction by Roscoe Pound. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1951. Pp. xii, 527, $7.50.
LAW AND SOCmTY IN EVOLUTION. By Sidney Post Simpson and Julius
Stone. Introduction by Roscoe Pound. St. Paul: West Publishing Co.,
1948. Pp. xlvi, 692.
LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. By Sidney Post Simpson and
Julius Stone. Introduction by Roscoe Pound. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1949. Pp. xlii, 1952.
LAW, TOTALITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY. By Sidney Post Simpson and

Julius Stone. Introduction by Roscoe Pound. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1949. Pp. xlii, 2389.
American legal scholarship has offered six general survey works on
Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy since 1948.1 This period has been
the most productive and creative era in American legal history for
works of this type. The lawyer, judge, student and teacher of today
have unprecedented opportunities through these materials for digging
at the roots of law. Needless to say, the subject-matter is immensely
practical, intellectually stimulating, and much of it represents the kind
of fundamental thinking lawyers must do if they are to contribute to
the survival and progress of man.
The reviewer approaches with trepidation a group review of these
some 4,509 pages of materials on jurisprudence and legal philosophy,
the total significance and meaning of which can only be partially felt,
or glimpsed, let alone conveyed. To squeeze out the essence of each
with any degree of sureness would be an exercise of faith of which
the reviewer is incapable at this moment in history. But squeeze a
little we must, to borrow a Cardozoism.
After reading these books the reviewer's bird's eye impression concerning each of them runs somewhat as follows: The Patterson book
1. Professor Stone, co-author with the late Professor Sidney Post Simpson,
is an Australian who has lived, studied, and taught in the United States for
years, and is in reality one of the foremost scholars on American law.
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is a treatise (not a collection of materials) giving an analytical synthesis of the dominant patterns of legal theory in the western world;
a work largely "devoted to the realm of legal philosophy, which has
chiefly to do with logical and ethical theories about law," (vii), which
is filled with illustrative cases, clarifying observations and superb
craftsmanship. The Cohen and Cohen book is a collection of writings
(plus some cases reported, but numerous case references) which focuses upon basic legal conceptions, a wide realm of ideas, arranged in
such a manner as to permit orderly comparison among the contributors
and with synthesizing articles at the end of main topics which often
draw the previous materials together for analysis, criticism, speculation, and orientation- the emphasis is historical and philosophical,
logical and ethical; it deals with law in the realm of ideas and social
events; it is designed to furnish a pattern of thought, a way of approach to basic questions of the legal system. The Simpson and Stone
Book One, Law and Society in Evolution, is a collection of cases and
writings arranged in historical and sociological perspective giving a
great over-view of the evolution of the law of the western world in
terms of stages of evolution and the birth and impact of the ideas and
social events which were the main subject matter of the evolution, and
arranged in terms of legal institutions, and demands upon the legal
system. The time sequence begins with Hammurabi and ends with
modern times and situations. The Simpson and Stone Book Two, Law
in Modern Democratic Society, is a collection of cases and writings
about the facts, pressures, events and institutions of law in such modern society, arranged in terms of interests pressing upon the law and
secured by the law as it is buffeted (and buffets) the stream of life.
The law meets and resolves some issues. Many remain to be met and
resolved. The book is a dynamic display of the anatomy of modern
democracy in the context of laws and legal institutions. The Simpson
and Stone Book Three, Law, Totalitarianism and Democracy, builds
upon Books One and Two (mostly Two, although Book Three is completely integrated and can be taught or read alone), and follows a pattern similar to Book Two, but its cases and materials are designed for
comparative study of the basic legal institutions, ideas, and law patterns of the Nazi, Fascist, Communist and Democratic state types, with
comprehensive insights on the fundamental legal issues of present day,
and future, democracy as it strains to achieve its as yet unachieved
ideal realization. In all three of the Simpson and Stone books there are
numerous cases and a large segment of the writings come from appropriate social science sources.
The Reuschlein book is a textual type survey designed to present
general summaries of the main contemporary contributors to legal
thought in the United States, with extensive quotations from the con-

BOOK REVIEWS
tributors. "This book is intended to be a 'survey' and it is offered as
just that. It is the hope of the author that the reader will be prompted
to read the works of the 'Prophets' in their original form." (v.).
To a varying, though often large, degree these works necessarily, in
view of their scope, must draw from similar sources. When a world
is surveyed the world is the given. The Patterson, Cohen and Cohen,
and Simpson and Stone books are superb scholarly accomplishments
which reveal eminent scholars contributing to knowledge in a manner
designed by themselves, and oriented toward filling a gap in the legal
universe which they conceive requires filling. Each work fills a large
gap in legal scholarship. The works are meshed, though not meshed.
They are tools for the classroom which can be used together or separately. Each will add to the other. Each can stand alone. Patterson
systematizes, analyzes and classifies. Cohen and Cohen deal in ideas by
presenting the ideas for the reader to read. Simpson and Stone give a
dynamic perspective of what we are dealing with. This oversimplifies.
To further the oversimplication. The reviewer left Simpson and Stone
with the question: What must we do? He left Cohen and Cohen with
the question: How must we think? He left Patterson with the question: What can we utilize in doing and thinking? Thus, the process
is unending. It is the process of perfecting society, man and law.
A review of this type could take all the books and compare their
emphases and materials; or it could present impressionistic glances at
each. The latter will be done since it is believed clarity concerning
each will be aided. Professor Patterson's Jurisprudence is clearly the
most comprehensive and scholarly account by an American in a single
book of the scope, nature, structure, sources, definition and function of
law as envisaged as a system and as seen largely in the context of
modern times. However, the time sweep of the Patterson work is inclusive since it deals with ideas as well as with men. It is a book
which is the result of nearly a half century of thought about legal
philosophy and jurisprudence, and it is the fruition of a generation of
teaching such materials to law classes by the author, and of years of
thinking about how this subject-matter can be presented to students
and lawyers for the nourishment of their intellects. It is a basic text,
a lawyer's guide, and a teacher's tool. It is not a parade of summaries
where the inexperienced reader is left high and dry. Throughout, it is
enriched by extensive examples from the cases and hard facts with
which students and lawyers deal. One could, indeed, prepare from the
ample footnote and other bibliographic materials many collections of
readings of cases and materials to go along with the treatise for emphasis and elaboration. The book is written with superb and studious
clarity, and so establishes an ideal for works of this type. The influence
upon Professor Patterson exercised by Dean Pound and Professor John
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Dewey is referred to by the author and is at once apparent; yet, the
book is clearly an original contribution by the author to legal literature. A national authority in Insurance Law and Contracts and Legal
Philosophy bespeaks the fact that his treatise speaks with a varied
background. A summary review can only hit a few of the high spots
in such a comprehensive treatise.
The author had in mind the student when he wrote this book.
"The novice on jurisprudence is often baffled when he finds that
every book or article on the subject presupposes the reading of a
dozen others. Hence the implications of the writer's ideas are here
spelled out to an extent that some professional jurisprudence
[jurisprudents?] or philosophers will find over-simplified and even
distorted. For the same reason, one will find repetitions, frequent
cross-references to other parts of this book, and frugality in footnoting." (viii). After emphasizing the practical value to the "hardboiled practitioner" (p.4) of jurisprudence, the author's love of
subject-matter is revealed by the statement, "Through jurisprudence
you may look at life in society and, like 0. W. Holmes, you may catch
an echo of the infinite." (p.4). Part I (pp.1-66) orients the student in
the province or scope of jurisprudence, and particularly enlightening
materials reveal the role of the various branches of philosophy in the
law, and the reviewer would call attention to the materials on logic
and scientific method, semantics, and ethics and value-theory. Brief
reference illustrates the role of the social sciences in jurisprudence,
and a thought provoking classification is made of jurisprudence into
the internal and external disciplines (the latter including relations between law and government, society, justice, logic, etc., and the former
emphasizing internal structure or discipline). Part II (pp.66-180) deals
with the fundamental question "What is Law?" Different answers
emerge depending on whether the inquiry relates to law's relations to
the state, society, ethical ideas, or social control. The author emphasizes the first of these relationships, or the imperative conception of
law. The generality, normative character, authority, and sanction of
law are depicted with brilliance. This part should be a most helpful
supplement to the case study by making the student aware of the many
faceted characteristics of the phenomenon of law. Throughout this
part are references to the ideas men have had on this subject written
in the context of contrast between men and schools of thought and
with understandable illustrations of the points involved. Part III
(pp.180-325) is "concerned primarily with the problem of 'finding the
law.'" (p.180). "'Finding the law' is the static aspect of legal judgments, that is, of the reasoning process of arriving at 'legal judgments.'" (p.180). How are judicial judgments made? By logical application of rules of law? Here are to be found the main theories and
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writings on this subject of the present time. Part IV (pp.325-559),
What Should Be The Law, is a comprehensive summary and analysis
of the principal theories of modern times concerning what the law
should be, with nearly a hundred pages on pragmatism, sociological
jurisprudence and legal realism. Part V (pp.559-595) is a critical study
of the judicial process. Six pages are required to list the table of cases
cited in this work. Over twenty-three pages of books and periodicals
cited furnish a good bibliography for further study. The care of editing and clarity of writing is superb. This work should be widely used.
The reviewer utilized it in many places in teaching contracts while
he was reading it for review preparation. Indeed, Patterson's book,
the Cohen and Cohen book, and one of Simpson and Stone's volumes
were taken to class to illustrate the point that the question of "meeting
of the minds," and Restatement 45 and 90 were nothing more than
quite fundamental problems in jurisprudence and that the student is
thinking jurisprudentially when he wrestles with the conceptions
therein involved. There is no course in law school which this work
would not enrich. A ditto for the Cohen and Cohen, and Simpson and
Stone books should be added.
The Cohen and Cohen book is an illustration of superb editing resulting in the handling of materials on the fundamental characteristics
of law and society in a manner which builds on historical perspective,
contrariety of opinion, and final synthesis. Oddly enough, the work
does not read like a mere patchwork of collections, but like the integrated, organized and oriented book that it is. The product of the
scholarly work of father and son, Dr. Felix S. Cohen completed the
work after the untimely death of the late Professor Morris R. Cohen,
one of America's great philosophers who contributed so much to
scholarship in many fields during his life - he was one of the few
philosophers of modern times who nourished the law by his insights.
The reviewer has utilized this book for student research assignments,
and plans to use it as a basic text this next semester. The work consists
of four parts. Part I, Legal Institutions, develops the fundamental concepts of property, contract, torts and liability, and crime and punishment. The nature and types of property is revealed by traversing materials from Grotius to Berle and Means. The origin and justification
of private property is seen in a context of such different works as The
Institutes of Justinian and Tawney's The Aquisitive Society. The practical value for student use of these materials has been experienced by
the reviewer in the use of the materials on the nature and types of contracts, with illustrations from Kant, Hegel, Pollock, Williston, Holmes,
Corbin, Oliphant and Llewellyn. The subject "what promises should
be enforced" is introduced with the famous Adkins, Blaisdell and
Parrish cases where the Supreme Court, it will be recalled, wrestled
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and won over 19th century tendencies to quarantine legislative adjustment affecting contractual freedom. The advanced student, and this
is not a work for beginning law students, will find old names, places
and cases throughout this first part, and the materials on crime and
punishment will give him much to think about concerning the nature
and causes of crime, and the purposes and role of punishment in society, which he probably caught only fleeting glimpses of in the
standard cases and materials on criminal law. The reviewer would
have welcomed more materials from the modern criminologists in this
latter chapter, but the basic data are here for discussion and further
research. Perhaps, such materials would not have been appropriate
since this chapter is not one on the dynamics of crime, the psychoses
of criminal behavior or of the modem society, but of a consideration
of the more generalized nature of crime and punishment in a philosophic as contrasted to a sociologic context.
While Part I does not pretend to explore other than perhaps the
essence of the specific subjects mentioned, it will serve as a framework
in which to consider much of the other materials. Part II, The General
Theory of Law, begins with a chapter on The Nature of Law. A fascinating comparison of different theories is offered through materials,
among others, from St. Thomas ("law is something pertaining to reason"), Coke ("artificial reason" of the law), Blackstone (" 'a rule of
civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a state, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong.' "), Savigny (the customary nature of law), Austin (law as command of the state), and
samples from Holmes, Pound and Erlich which bring the approaches
of modern pragmatic and sociologic thought for evaluation alongside
the previous theories. The authors conclude this chapter with their
articles which discuss the implications of the various theories upon
ways of thinking about law. "A definition of law is useful or useless.
It is not true or false." (p.429). This should be a most interesting
chapter to teach. They illustrate the confusion in thinking concerning
the moral element in law in "other-worldly terms" rather than in
"earthly terms." (p.434). "If ethical values are inherent in all realms
of human conduct, the ethical appraisal of a legal situation is not to be
found in the spontaneous outpourings of a sensitive conscience unfamiliar with the social context, the background of precedent, and the
practices and expectations, legal and extra-legal, which have grown
up around a given type of transaction." (p.434). "It is the great disservice of the classical conception of law that it hides from judicial
eyes the ethical character of every judicial question, and thus serves
to perpetuate class prejudices and uncritical moral assumptions which
could not survive the sunlight of free ethical controversy." (p.434).
In The Nature of the Judicial Process the authors explore the prob-
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lems of the "relationship between rules and concrete decisions," "the
'phonograph' theory," the filling of the gap between rules and decisions
by ethical values, the filling of the gap "by reliance on expertise" and
the relationship between judicial power and despotism (p.439). The
concluding article by Dr. Felix Cohen furnishes excellent basis for
critical evaluation of theories of the judicial process and of our limitations of knowledge concerning the nature of this process. "Only by
probing behind the decision to the forces which it reflects, or projecting beyond the decision the lines of its force upon the future, do we
come to an understanding of the meaning of the decision itself."
(p.479). In chapter 7 on Legislation the authors consider the fundamental problem "of the intellectual and non-intellectual sources" of
the friction between the legislative and judicial processes (p.483).
Part III, Law and General Philosophy, consists of a critical review
of the role of logic and scientific method in the law, the logical nature
of legal propositions and questions, and the relationship between law
and ethics; and the classic The Place of Logic in the Law (p.540) by
Morris R. Cohen cannot be otherwise described than as a monumental
epitaph for a great mind and human being, and the same author's
Law and Scientific Method can perhaps be glancingly seen by the
statement "To urge that judges, for instance, should rely on their
experience or intuition in disregard of logically formulated principles
is to urge sentimental anarchy. Men will generalize in spite of themselves." (p.560). "The law, and especially present American law, is
desperately in need of a scientific elaboration ....
Stare decisis means
little in a changing society when for every new case the number--of
possible precedents is practically unwieldly. Without principles as
guides, the body of precedents becomes an uncharted sea; and reliance
on principles is worse than useless unless these principles receive critical scientific attention." (p.566). The reviewer finds a marked tendency in himself to devote a review length consideration of such
individual articles, as for example the brilliant materials by Felix S.
Cohen on The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism: "The ethical responsibilities of the judge have so often been obscured by the supposed
duty to be logically consistent in the decision of different cases that it
may be pertinent to ask whether any legal decision can ever be
logically inconsistent with any other decision." (p.590). Suffice it to
say that the chapter on Law and Ethics could only be superb in view
of Felix S. Cohen's vast contributions in. this field. The materials on
Law and Metaphysics might conveniently be read with Patterson's
materials on the same subject. The concluding essay by Felix S. Cohen
on Field Theory and Judicial Logic contains a forceful appeal toward
understanding the "legal ideals" of -those with whom we disagree
rather than to intolerantly cast them off without critical examination.
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"In fact, I find it to be a fair working assumption that when a legal
philosopher says something that I recognize to be absurd, the statement probably meant something different to him than it means to me."
(p,70 5 ).
-Part IV, Law and the Social Sciences, utilizes history to consider the
ethical, political, economic and other interpretations of history in quest
of understanding of the historical process and so of values to live by.
Anthropology is demonstrated as furnishing valuable insights for
critical evaluation of modern institutions, and to permit evaluation in
broader perspective; it offers "new observation posts from which to
study the variations in human institutions and to compare the consequences of alternative social patterns." (p.786). Both Patterson and
Simpson and Stone drew upon modern anthropological scholarship
for insights into the nature of law and society. The same may be said
concerning Law and Economics where changes in the nature of industrialized society, theories of economics and economic arrangements
are felt in legal doctrine. Law and Politics begins with the introductory note comment "If one finds property, contract, liability and crime
to be products or functions of government, the student of law can
hardly refuse to face the basic problems of government." (p.860).
Space does not permit a summary, except that the materials consider
the age-old problem of "how to govern the governors," (p.861), the
problem of bureaucracy, the problem of the consent of the governed,
and the problem of political ideals which "treats some of the basic
value issues with which the chapter on Law and Ethics deals and to
which most of the other chapters of this volume ultimately point."
(p.861).
The Cohen and Cohen book is a mine of excellent bibliographic materials. Brief introductory notes highlight chapter problems. It is a
notable contribution to legal scholarship and should if widely used influence the coming generation of lawyers toward a critical evaluation
.of the role of law, and the students' own roles, in preserving sanity in
a strife torn world. The materials can be used for separate course, or
courses, or as collateral reading for separate substantive and procedural courses, or, indeed, they could be assigned as reading for
-the student body, if the curriculum does not possess a separate course
in jurisprudence. The same, of course, would be said of the Patterson
and Simpson and Stone works.
The three books by Simpson and Stone have been taught by the
reviewer in separate courses over a period of time. The tendency to
elaborate on them will be curtailed because the books have been reviewed in other places, since they were published in 1948-1949. As
teaching tools they are outstanding. There is no one set of books
which, in the reviewer's judgment, reveals law in the total perspective
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of society as do these books. Nor, is there a more dynamic presentation
of the multi-faceted scope and nature of law. Likewise, the sharpness
of analysis of the basic issues of law in democratic society and the
pointing to problems unsolved and demanding solution is most enlightening. The opportunity for student study of similar phenomena
in the laws of the Nazi, Fascist, and Communist states and Democratic
states is presented in dramatic manner. All schools of jurisprudence
can be seen here, as well as the main theories and ideas expressed
about law.
Book one, Law and Society in Evolution, in the reviewer's judgment
is an unexcelled work for giving a student perspective of the kinds of
legal systems and legal thought which men of the western world
have had, and of the types of problems which those men have faced
in inventing a system to perform socially the task which law is designed to perform. Of course law's task differs depending on the time,
place, viewer and problems, values, power structures, and theories of
the nature of man and society, and the universe. From Kin-Organized
societies with their narrow kin units where law is mixed with custom
and religion, and administered by priest or wise man, where law is
intimately related to divine origin, and where the needs of man for
law have yet to be complicated by the pure food and drug acts or
atomic energy or refined philosophic speculations, and where the machinery of law enforcement is adapted to the mechanical, ritualistic
concepts of man of the time, the student emerges to Part II, Law in. an
Emergent Political Society, to observe the seething vortex of change
which arises when man invents the phenomenon of politically organized society and practices new ways of social control- forced tQ
do so by the nature of the institutions and demands which he finds
himself confronted with. Here are to be found the seeds of the modern
state, the modern lawyer, procedure, the emergence of the common
law, the jury system: all to large extent focused on a comparative basis
between Roman legal institutions, but largely emphasizing Anglo.Saxon and Early English traditions. Part III's Law and the Rise of
Commerce sees the birth of law's adjustment to man's newly discovered ways of making a living, his quest of ultimate standards for
law's measurement, and the conflict of modes of trial and the systems
of equity and the common law; new demands converge upon the legal
system as seen through the rise of contracts, the changing concepts
of property and its uses, growing problems with monopolies, the development of new remedies, and the birth of labor problems. Then
follows Part IV's Law and Expanding Industrialism which actually
furnishes us with a gigantic preview of law in the democratic state
or the modern industrialized state. Legislation tends to replace the
law making of the common law courts, and the theory of laissez faire,
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affects contracts and property utilization and state activities; the quest
of reform and simplification of procedure and substance begins; there
are efforts to cast off the institutions of the past which are preserved
in the present due to man's ignorance, tenacity to stick with the known
and fear of change; theories of judicial process wrestle over the slotmachine concept and sociological approach, and legislation meets the
tradition of the judiciary's urge of ordered continuity with the common law traditions. One ends the study with the awareness that the
process has not yet finished, is unending, furnishing constant challenge
to modern civilization, and one finds himself impelled to search for
standards or values for the guidance of future laws.
Book Two, Law in Modern Democratic Society, begins with the social and ideological background of such society, and proceeds to depict
the processes of growth, change and adaptation of the law to meet
new facts, events, inventions and demands. The classification is in
terms of the interests which are pressing upon the law and those which
are secured by the law. How to maintain the minimum physical
conditions of social life, preserve health, safety, peace and order,
how to deal with the automobile, health insurance, zoning and related
phenomena. Abundant cases reveal the judicial process in action with
novel problems together with statutory, and informative textual material. The sweep of modern business, financial, and labor institutions
is depicted and problems converge for solution, as economic and social
institutions are pelted with new pressures, or old pressures seen in
next context. Social institutions must be maintained and progress,
so problems of speech, voting, lobbying, marriage, homestead, divorce,
sterilization, contraception, religious oaths, atheism, public support of
eligion, morals, movies, crime and a host of other facets of the
social vortex are factually presented in scholarly context and set on a
plane for evaluating the competing interests and searching for value
standards for the decision by society's instrumentalities. Natural and
human resources are to be utilized and preserved. Water, soil, forest,
oil, gas, parks, child welfare, child labor, maternity, health, juvenile
delinquents and scientific views of control of crime, treatment of defectives, the vast problem of the unemployed and those who are lost
on the economic wayside, protection of business from themselves and
prevention of economic exploitation of the unprotected are illustrated
with superb clarity in the context of judicial decision, legislation and
scholarly observation. The individual life of man, as opposed to social
life, is displayed in the context of the protection of man's interest
in -personality, and changing forms and nature of property and pressures on the law of contract is revealed with similar types of materials as above. Restraints upon individual interests as seen through
the area of creditor's rights, bankruptcy legislation, spendthrift trusts,
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exemption of charities from tort liability, and restrictions upon, and
realization of, the sovereign immunity from suit doctrine. The vast
modern legal machinery of social control is revealed through analysis
of administrative, legislative and judicial process phenomena. The
materials of Book One are excellent background for the student in
measuring the procedure, efficacy, and state of disequilibrium of these
procedural components of the modern democratic state. Topped off
by comprehensive materials on the limitations upon law in the problem of social control, the book gives a truly dynamic and dramatic
picture of law in the present United States, or similar society. It is
on completing these two books that the noticeable difference between
the Simpson and Stone and the Cohen and Cohen materials is apparent.
The reviewer would suggest that the latter materials could be taught
with greater effectiveness if the teacher and student were aware of
the conflict producing social data which are available in the Simpson
and Stone volumes, and moreover the problems of the future of law,
the unsolved issues, and the vast stress for survival of our ideals can
be better seen from a background of the Simpson and Stone materials.
These will help dramatize the scholarly materials in the Cohen and
Cohen book. Indeed, the latter work and the former work complement
each other.
Book Three, Law, Totalitarianism and Democracy, one might say
(in order not to exceed the limits of a group review) builds 'on Book
Two, because here the fundamental forces playing upon law in the
modern democratic society are measured, evaluated, contrasted and
studied with those fbrces and institutions existing in the Nazi, Fascist, and Communist state types; and the last part of the book analyzes
with deep insight the problems of democracy in a time of change.
The problem of maintenance of freedom (an indispensable aspect of
democratic institutions), the issues of planning versus the spontaneous
productions of individuals in the market and social arena, and the horrendous implications of atomic energy and international affairs are
seen in the context of democratic institutions and ideals. Teaching
this book has been a fascinating experience from the standpoint of
observing increasing student awareness of the nature of the society
in which he lives, the problems of adjustment, the challenges in preserving democratic institutions, the sharpening of the realization of
the part which ultimate ideals play in shaping the law of a society,
the increasing acuity with which the student thinks and talks about
things which are "democratic," the tendency to pierce for the first
time folklores of democratic society which heretofore in the student
mind have gone uncontested. In all, Book Three is a happy ending
for this trilogy. Uppermost in the reader's mind, on completing these
three books, may be the problem of how to maximize the possibilities
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for democratic survival in the modern world. The reviewer might add
that in the course of teaching Book Two and Book Three various student projects analyzed the law of the state of Alabama for its "democratic" and "undemocratic" aspects, raising the problem, of course, of
standard and value formulation, and self-analysis. In these three books
are large segments of cases, statutory materials, and materials drawn
from the social sciences. To be mentioned is the forty-four pages at
the end of Book Three consisting of author index, table of cases,
and statutes (covering all three volumes): a valuable source of reference, as well as an indicia of the comprehensiveness of these volumes.
Editing is superb as in the Cohen and Cohen materials. Introductory
observations pave the way into the materials, and are excellent.
The Reuschlein book's contribution appears to be the systematic
presentation of materials concerning the contemporary American contributors to jurisprudential thought which may be used as a basis for
beginning orientation of the student and as a stimulant for further
reading. No complete picture of any one movement in this area of
legal scholarship can be obtained, nor is there the systematic direction
of the development of ideas and doctrines and insights which is apparent in the other five books under review. The author has written
in a clear style, and he lets the main personalities speak largely for
themselves, although he does insert his fundamental value positions,
and perhaps reveals the fear felt by other neo-scholastic scholars toward compromise, adjustment, and pragmatic adaptation without the
foundation of ultimate standards which all could agree upon. This
fundamental philosophic position has of course played a large role
in the history of thought, and is still vigorous. The "survey" purpose
of the author is well achieved, and no student could read this clearly
written work without having myriads of questions for further study.
Perhaps, he would be stimulated to get into the Patterson, Cohen and
Cohen, and Simpson and Stone works, and thence further into the
exciting atmosphere of winds of doctrine which overflow the jurispludential horizon at the present time.
JAY W.

M1URPHY*

THE STRANGE CASE OF ALGER Hiss. By The Earl Jowitt. Garden City:
Doubleday, 1953. Pp. 380.
Strange, indeed, does the case of Alger Hiss seem to this eminent
English lawyer and jurist, The Earl Jowitt. Alger Hiss, a man who
won distinction in preparatory school, in college, in law school, and
in public life, a man who began his professional career as secretary to
* Professor of Law, University of Alabama Law School.
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Mr. Justice Holmes, who later served his government, in various capacities, so effectively as to win rapid promotion and who had convinced all his colleagues and superiors of his integrity and devotion
to duty-this man was convicted of perjury. And at whose instigation? That of Whittaker Chambers, a man whose disreputable conduct concededly began not later than when he was in college, who
from 1924 or 1925 to 1938 was a member of the Communist party, living
a life of constant deception, endeavoring to harm, if not to destroy,
his government; a man who, after his professed renunciation of communism and atheism and his conversion to the Christian faith, committed perjury in testimony before a Grand Jury with reference to the
very matters which were the subject of his testimony against Hiss.
Small wonder that the Earl should have been puzzled and have been
willing to give part of his leisure time to a study of the record of the
trial and of the Chambers story as related in Witness.
And he has made this study as a lawyer and a judge, not as a news
reporter or commentator, not as an interpreter of social or political
ideologies, not as a student of abnormal psychology, not as a modern
Jeremiah. As an English barrister and judge, he frowns upon our toofree pretrial publication of matter bearing upon the guilt or innocence
of an accused. He takes at face value our accepted doctrine that a defendant must be acquitted unless proved guilty in open court beyond
a reasonable doubt. In this connection he conceives the function of
the prosecuting attorney actually to be what our highest courts have
officially proclaimed it to be, namely, to put the facts before the jury
fairly without distortion and without appeal to emotion or prejudice,
so that no innocent man may be convicted and no man go free who
has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And he believes
that the trial judge should assist the jury by an analysis of the evidence, as the judge always does in England, and, as this reviewer can
dogmatically assert, a United States district judge may very properly
do, although not obliged to do so. All this a reader must bear in mind,
if he is to understand the learned Ex-Chancellor's analysis and
commentary.
In this book he puts before the reader his impressions of Alger Hiss
and his wife as gathered from the record of the trial, and of the
Chambers as revealed in the record and in Witness; he analyzes their
stories and weighs the evidence where they conflict; he considers the
testimony of Chambers and Hiss in the light of their previous statements to government officials, Congressional committees and Grand
Jury; he explains trial by jury as conducted in England, contrasting
the American procedure as exemplified in this trial with reference
particularly to the function of the judge and the obligations of prosecuting counsel; he expresses with deference his astonishment at the
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volume of remotely relevant evidence that was received; and makes
some trenchant remarks, with characteristically English understatement, concerning some aspects of the trial. Many of the objectionable
features he charitably attributes to our theory that the lawyers, rather
than the judge, try the case.
His impression of Hiss, derived from the record, is that of "a man
somewhat conceited, too conscious that he had met on intimate terms
the most distinguished of his countrymen, not over-ready to be forthcoming with his less distinguished compatriots, and in short not
suffering fools gladly, and not being a 'good mixer'- so immersed in
his official life that he took little or no trouble about the affairs of his
private life." (p.67). But he got from the record no impression of dishonesty. With Whittaker Chambers, on the other hand, as he put it,
"the desire to embroider and embellish is so transcendent that I do
not believe he knows when he is leaving the straight and narrow path
of truth." His judgment on public affairs he finds to be "equally unreliable" (p.46). He recognizes the brilliant qualities of mind of Chambers, but he repeatedly states that a jury could place no reliance on his
testimony except when corroborated. Consequently when the stories
of Chambers and Hiss conflict, he requires corroboration of the former's statements and in most instances fals to find it.
As to Mrs. Hiss and Mrs. Chambers he thinks each was inclined to
go to extremes in support of her husband. But he makes no specific
charges against the former. He dismisses Mrs. Chambers, so far as
her credit is concerned, with the following quotation from the examination by Mr. Murphy: "If he (meaning Chambers) told you that
starting tomorrow, we are going to Ypsilanti and your name was
Hogan?" Answer: "We would go to Ypsilanti and we would be Hogans." "It is perhaps hardly necessary," he adds, "to say that she
corroborated her husband's testimony about visits -but about documents she knew nothing." (p.82).
Nine-tenths of the testimony at the trial had to do with efforts to
show close contacts between Hiss and Chambers and their families
from 1934 to 1938 and the association of Hiss with other persons alleged to be communists. From this mass of material the author selects
that dealing with the alleged subletting of the Hiss apartment to
Chambers, the transfer of the old Hiss Ford car, the alleged loan of
$400 from Hiss to Chambers, who never offered to repay it, the time
and circumstances of a gift of a rug by Chambers to Hiss, various
alleged automobile trips, and the alleged meetings between Hiss and
communists of higher rank than Chambers. As to most of these, the
author finds flaws in the Chambers version. He insists that the attention devoted to' these matters tended to obscure the real issue,
namely, whether Hiss lied when he told the Grand Jury that he had
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not turned over to Chambers in or about February and March 1938,
docurents or copies of documents taken by Hiss from the State Department. And it was upon this issue that the testimony of Chambers
required corroboration. This requirement of corroboration is fixed
by law as a condition of conviction for perjury. The testimony of a
single witness, no matter how trustworthy, is not sufficient. And The
Earl Jowitt would not believe Chambers under oath on any important
matter, except in so far as he was corroborated.
Alger Hiss had a trial by jury in which all the requisites of a fair
trial were observed under our adversary system. That is assured, for
his conviction was affirmed by an able appellate court. This does not
mean that the appellate court believed him guilty, but that no reversible error was found in the record. As a lawyer the author must
and does recognize that all an accused can ask is a fair trial on the
same conditions as those accorded to other members of the community.
Our system no more guarantees the acquittal of the innocent than
the conviction of the guilty. But when a man who has risen high in a
cultured community and has established affirmatively an unblemished
reputation for integrity is charged with so despicable an offense, it is
particularly important that his guilt be established beyond peradventure to a jury insulated so far as possible from prejudice and
assisted by a judge trained in separating the unimportant from the
crucial and in making the distinction clear to the jury. What has
worried and continues to worry the Ex-Chancellor follows:
1. The Congressional investigations with the wide publicity given
them through television, radio and press, the partisan comments in
the press, and the criticism of the conduct of the first trial by various
persons including some members of Congress, given extensive publicity in newspapers and magazines, created a climate of opinion which
could scarcely fail to affect the jurors, no matter how conscientiously
they strove to overcome it.
2. In his revelations to officers of government, to the Congressional
Committees and to the Grand Jury, prior to the pre-trial hearings in
the action for libel brought by Hiss against Chambers, Chambers not
only failed to allege any espionage activities by Hiss but repeatedly,
under oath and otherwise, asserted that he knew of no such conduct
by Hiss. He accused Hiss and his brother Donald of being dues-paying
communists, told inconsistent stories as to his collection of dues from
them, and, at the trial, the innocence of this charge as to Donald Hiss
was conclusively shown.
3. The evidence as to the alleged first act of treachery by Hiss in
furnishing Chambers secret State Department documents from the
Nye Committee files was persuasive that the documents then procured
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by Chambers were not secret but were available to the press generally. Indeed, the author thinks that the complete refutation of the
testimony of Chambers on this point shows that he was so willing to
manufacture any and all sorts of evidence that doubt properly falls
upon the authenticity of even the crucial type-written documents.
4. The conduct of the prosecutor did not measure up to the standard
set in English practice. "I do not think," says the author, "that it is
proper for Counsel for the Prosecution to use every legitimate means
to secure a conviction in a doubtful case." And he feels Mr. Murphy
in his final summing up commented unfairly on some testimony, and
for the first time suggested that a comparison of the typed documents
with the typing of letters written by Mrs. Hiss would show that Mrs.
Hiss typed the secret documents. And this latter argument apparently impressed the jury for they later asked for the documents.
5. The judge in his charge made no analysis of the evidence, but
left the jury to apply it to the issues without guidance. In England,
it would have been his duty to make a survey of the evidence.
6. The only real corroboration of the testimony of Chambers is
found in the evidence that the crucial typewritten documents were
typed on the Hiss typewriter while in the possession of Hiss. The
inference that they were typed with his knowledge and consent is
strong, but in view of all the other testimony, it is not strong enough
to remove all reasonable doubt. Hiss may be guilty, but the prosecution did not prove his guilt.
Of course it is impossible for any person to know whether or not
Alger Hiss was guilty. How much, if any, truth there is in the testimony of Chambers or in his book is likewise unknowable. Opinions
are sharply divided, vigorously expressed, most of them founded on
inadequate data. Anyone who desires to form an intelligent opinion
as to the justice of the conviction by the second jury will find the
essential materials in this book. The learned Ex-Chancellor does not
hesitate to express his own conclusions, but he does not ask the reader
to accept them.
EDMUND M. MORGAN*

THE NEW SCIENCE OF PoLiTics: AN INTRODUCTION. By Eric Voegelin.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. Pp. xiii, 193. $3.00.
The author is a very learned product of Kelsen's Vienna School of
Pure Law. Although the present work has in itself nothing to do with
law, its legal-theoretical value as well as the author's heritage can
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

1953]

BOOK REVIEWS

be readily discerned. For it is the axis around which rotates his theory
that politics, to be a science, must not be "gnostic," by attempting
to establish absolute (hence authoritarian) values. Even as natural
law and democracy are truly incompatible -because if law is "natural," divine, supreme, and immutable, it need not and indeed ought
not be based on the will of the majority - so are politics as a revelation
and politics as a science. Although the author makes no reference to
legal theory and the natural law controversy, the parallelism is obvious. It is for this reason that the book ought to be read by lawyers.
The author's fight against the dream world of political dogmatism,
or "gnosticism" as he calls it in a rather broad way, leads to the
realization that it has been a habit of man -of Western and Islamic
man, at least -to justify every variety of political theory and action
upon the basis of some allegedly absolute truth, be it the Bible, Aristotle, or the divinity as such or as represented through its temporal
agents. The "gnostic insanity" inevitably leads to continuous warfare
both spiritual and on the battlefield.
The book, very erudite and at times not at all easy reading, proposes that the strongest resistance against gnosticism can be found in
philosophers of John Locke's tradition and in the modern AngloAmerican democracies. He thinks that there is a mere glimmer of
hope, requiring all our efforts, that we might repress gnostic corruption as manifested in modern totalitarianism and restore the forces
of civilization, that is, of classic and early Christian thinking.
REGiNALD PARKER*
*
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